Stretching
the Language of DUI Laws
Information
courtesy of Lawrence Taylor - DUIblog
It
has long been a basic tenet of law that the language of criminal
statutes must be reasonably interpreted, and if there is any ambiguity
in that language the statute must be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. As the United States Supreme Court has clearly stated:
First,
as we have recently reaffirmed, "ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."....This
principle is founded on two policies that have long been part
of our tradition. First, "a fair warning should be given
to the world in language that the common world will understand,
of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To
make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear."...Second,
because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because
criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation
of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity. (cites) Thus, where there is ambiguity in a criminal
statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant. [Emphasis
added.] U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
Except,
apparently, in drunk driving cases. In yet another example of what
I have repeatedly referred to as "the DUI exception to the
Constitution", police, prosecutors and judges continue stretching
the language of drunk driving statutes to ludicrous extremes in
their effort to encompass as many citizens in the DUI dragnet as
possible.
Most
states have statutes with language essentially similar to that of
California:
It
is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of any alcoholic
beverage or drug...to drive a vehicle.
The
meaning of "drive" would seem fairly clear to any reasonable
person. Yet, I have reported cases where
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